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Foreword 
The Dams Debate: Neither ‘small’ nor ‘large’ is the question, but well-planned and 
well-managed1 
Dams as large infrastructure have a high potential for development. They can balance hy-
drological variability, both inter-annual and inter-seasonal, by storing water for all sectors 
of a national economy, and they serve as one means for controlling devastating floods. 
They are key means to exploit the huge untapped hydropower potential in particular in 
China, India, Brazil, Russia and on the African continent which lags far behind the rest of 
the world. Well-planned and well-managed they can support adaptation to changes in hy-
drology. 
No other infrastructure has attracted that much criticism than dams because of their detri-
mental negative social and ecological effects. Estimates about dam-induced displacement 
of people range in the order of 40 to 80 million, of which the lion’s share are in India and 
China. As a Canadian non-governmental organization reasoned, it is not the financial cri-
sis setting back investments to exploit a huge technical and economic potential, but “the 
notion of acceptability on social and environmental levels.” 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) has set a landmark with its “Dams and Devel-
opment. New Framework for Decision-Making” released in December 2000. It is without 
doubt that the recommendations have touched key questions of how development should 
happen. However, the WCD has defined ideal type norms to guide dam-related decision-
making. Being excluded from the WCD process, the governments of the hydro-
superpowers were sceptical about the seven strategic priorities and outright rejected the 26 
guidelines. But small countries, too, such as Nepal and Ethiopia accused the WCD on hin-
dering their social and economic development. 
Our Institute issued the research project “Sustainable Dam Development: Between Global 
Norms and Local Practices” on behalf of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (BMZ) targeting the dam policies of the hydro-superpowers. In these econo-
mies historically, dams have contributed to the countries’ goal of achieving food and en-
ergy security, with the latter becoming at least as important if not more given the escala-
tion in the energy/electricity demands. Thus, the importance of dams, in spite of being an 
extremely contested domain, continues to remain unabated. 
Acknowledging that dams are important infrastructural means for social and economic 
development, and that multilateral development banks and bilateral donors are re-
engaging in the dam business due to its renewable characteristics (low carbon energy), our 
Institute has looked into the dynamics and conditions enhancing the internalization of in-
ternational norms and standards. Country studies were conducted in India, China, Brazil 
and Turkey to find out if and how superior social and environmental norms like those of 
the World Commission Dams and the World Bank have influenced planning and imple-
mentation of large water / hydropower infrastructure over the years. 
                                                 
1 This appraisal was made by Director General of UNEP, Mr Klaus Toepfer, on the occasion of the Dams 
and Development Forum taking place in September 2003 in Geneva. 
The country studies, of which that on China (Hensengerth 2010) and now on India are 
available, analyse the highly complex multilevel dam-related decision-making processes 
being particularly interested in whether, why and how planning and decision-making has 
been opening up to diverse societal interests. At the national level the evolution of social 
and environmentally sustainable dam governance is being studied in detail in two specific 
fields, i.e. the planning procedures for mitigating negative environmental impacts, and for 
expropriation and resettlement. Since impacts are clearest at project level, analysis of indi-
vidual dam cases focused on their specific actor constellations and the impact they had. 
Looking at individual projects, we have been investigating whether international / domes-
tic actors have fostered sustainable practices, and the repercussions on overall policies.  
The India study has shown that civil society has for long been the major actor working 
towards gradual and progressive changes in dam-related policies. Through its own net-
work which linked local, regional and national NGOs, it has been advocating for superior 
social and environmental standards. However, in the individual dam projects analysed, the 
presence of international actors like the International Finance Corporation catalysed this 
process referring to their standards which are superior to those asked for by Indian regula-
tions. But their presence is in no way a sufficient condition that these norms get imple-
mented.  
The author points out that it has not been the WCD who influenced dam-related policies in 
India. Based on a cross-temporal study of civil society action in India for the last three 
decades, he argues that the norms being negotiated and circulating in the domestic policy 
arena only got an international anchor, i.e. WCD. 
Nirmalya Choudhury concludes that national policies on environment and resettlement 
have not progressed on strategic issues: decisions on option assessment or gaining public 
acceptance have hardly changed over the years, and issues which could potentially open a 
window through which projects as such, or their design, can be questioned, continue to be 
exclusively controlled by the government. Operational issues, on the other hand, like the 
mandatory preparation of resettlement action plans, public participation in preparing these 
plans and detailing of how the public hearing process is to be conducted and recorded 
have shown progress over the years. At the project level monitoring compliance of the 
environmental management plans continues to be a challenge for both the regulatory au-
thority and the project developer. In spite of a three decade long discourse criticising cash-
based compensation, this form continues to be dominant. 
When the Ministry of Environment and Forests was nominated the lead agency of the fed-
eral government for COP15 negotiations, and an efficient minister was put at the head of the 
Ministry, positive spillover effects to the dam issue started. They particularly refer to im-
proving the status of the environmental clearance process in the country and to the strict 
monitoring of whether project developers adhere to environmental management plans.  
Bonn, August 2010   Waltina Scheumann 
     Dept Environmental Policy and  
     Natural Resources Management 
Abstract 
This paper explores reforms in environmental and resettlement policies in India and the 
influence of domestic and external actors on the reform process. It also analyses the ways 
in which environment and resettlement policies have been implemented in a number of 
hydropower projects. At project level the analysis focuses on how state and non-state ac-
tors influence decision-making on the introduction of superior environmental and social 
standards through changes in policies and laws. At macro level, the study begins by de-
scribing the multilevel processes that govern dam decision-making. It then considers the 
legal and policylevel changes in the areas of environmental clearance and resettlement and 
the role played by state and non-state actors in the changes that have been made in the last 
three decades. 
The dam projects selected are the Allain Duhangan Project, which is being funded by the 
International Finance Corporation, and the domestically funded Lower Subansiri and Di-
bang Multipurpose projects, the aim being to understand how superior social and envi-
ronmental standards are put into practice and the role played by various state and non-state 
actors in this. The study argues that, at macro level, it is civil society which has been the 
major driver of change in the area of resettlement over the last three decades. In the envi-
ronment arena the changes are the outcome of competing demands from civil society and 
growth-oriented ministries and departments of the Government of India. At project level, 
superior social and environmental standards are primarily driven by social mobilisation 
initiated by civil society. The presence of international actors like the International Fi-
nance Corporation, with superior social and environmental policies, catalyses the process.  
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1 Introduction 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) has often been cited as a prototypical example 
of a diverse multi-stakeholder platform engaged in the formulation of international norms 
and guidelines on the extremely controversial issue of dams. While a multi-stakeholder 
forum as WCD was expected to achieve a consensus among the various stakeholders, this 
is precisely what it has failed to do. Initial research on the WCD confirmed the failure to 
convert the consensus within the Commission into a broader stakeholder consensus 
(Dubash et al. 2001; Streck 2002). The Indian Ministry of Water Resources and such gov-
ernment parastatals as the National Hydro Power Corporation were among those who re-
jected the WCD’s recommendations. The Government of India reaffirmed that it would 
continue its dam-building policy with an overall objective of constructing new storage 
capacity of around 25 billion cubic metres (BCM) in the next 25 years (GoI Ministry of 
Water Resources s. a.). 
While the official response from the Government of India was outright rejection of the 
WCD recommendations, India has witnessed the ongoing formulation and reformulation 
of policy pertaining to the resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced people in recent 
times. In 2004 the Indian Government adopted the first national policy on resettlement, 
which was reformulated in 2007. In 1994 the first Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) 
Notification was introduced to ensure a statutory environmental governance system in 
project planning. This notification was revamped in 2006 through the enactment of a fresh 
EIA Notification.  
This study seeks to establish whether past policy changes relating to various aspects of the 
social and environmental sustainability of dams in India have been the result of the gradual 
influence of global norms or whether they have been driven by domestic policy learning 
processes, or a judicious mix of the two. The aim is to determine whether global norms like 
those contained in the WCD recommendations have induced changes in resettlement and 
environment planning processes and to investigate pathways and norm carriers. 
The study begins with the observation that the Government of India has rejected the WCD 
report which recommended for inclusive project planning and decision-making, a right 
and risk approach and the recognition and abatement of adverse environmental impacts. 
However, in recent years the Planning Commission2 has been discussing inclusive devel-
opment, while the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) and the Ministry of Ru-
ral Development have drafted and redrafted policies on environmental impact assessment 
and resettlement, respectively. These recent developments raise the interesting question 
whether they are manifestations of the gradual diffusion of global norms among the policy 
elites in the country, outcomes of a domestic policy learning process through the involve-
ment of domestic governmental and non-governmental actors well insulated from the ef-
fect of any international actors and activities or a combination of the two. 
It is hypothesised that the extent to which global norms like the WCD’s are diffused in the 
domestic policy arena and the extent to which dam decision-making takes account of so-
cially and environmentally sustainable norms depends primarily on social mobilisation, on 
                                                 
2 The Planning Commission is an apex planning body. 
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a country’s embeddedness in international institutions and on its dependence on multilat-
eral and bilateral financial institutions or international technology transfer. 
The study adopts a two-level approach: it analyses the nature of policy, regulatory changes 
and what triggers them and considers selected dam projects. It is assumed that develop-
ment at national level shapes project planning and practices through the formulation of 
laws and policies, while it is the individual project where laws and policies actually mani-
fest themselves and where actual changes to superior social and environmental standards 
become evident – and may even have spill-over effects. Norm evolution and implementa-
tion will be analysed in two policy fields: (i) the use of environmental impact assessment 
as a tool in the planning of and decision-making on dams, and (ii) expropriation and reset-
tlement policies. 
The study applies a qualitative research methodology in which cross-temporal process 
analysis and content analysis is undertaken at country level in respect of the environmental 
and resettlement issues. The case study approach is adopted at project level. The data for 
analysis were collected in unstructured interviews with key informants, focus group dis-
cussions and participatory observation. Secondary information, such as press briefings, 
documents and various published and unpublished governmental and non-governmental 
documents, have also been analysed. 
2 The strategic role of dams for India’s economic and social development 
India ranks fourth in the world after China, the United States and Russia in terms of the 
number of its dams. There are more than 4,000 large dams, which play an important role 
in the country. In India most dams are constructed and maintained by the water resource 
departments of the state governments. Certain dams built on interstate rivers and providing 
water-related services to more than one state are managed by separate institutions. In re-
cent years there has been a trend towards private-sector operation of hydropower dams. 
While many large reservoirs in other parts of the world are specifically intended for water 
supply, many in India were built primarily for irrigation purposes. But as many cities and 
towns are running out of water, numerous dams originally built for irrigation are now sup-
plying water for domestic consumption (Shah / Kumar 2008). The National Commission 
for Integrated Water Resources Development set up by the Government of India in 1999 
has forecast that the total water requirement for domestic purposes in the country as a 
whole will rise from 43 BCM in 2010 to 62 BCM in 2025 and to 111 BCM in 2050, most 
of which will come from surface sources (NCIWRD 1999). According to Sengupta 
(2000), of the 4,291 dams in the country, 96 per cent will have irrigation as either their 
sole objective or at least one of their objectives, and only 4.2 per cent will have power 
generation as one of their objectives. While it is generally agreed that agricultural produc-
tion has increased over the years, the actual contribution made by dam-reservoir-based 
projects to that increase has always been a matter of debate, all the more so as groundwa-
ter irrigation has grown in the country in the last three decades (Sengupta 2000).  
Large dams also assume strategic importance in India’s energy scenario. Large-scale hy-
dropower is now a preferred power generation technology because of its low recurring 
costs, its lower carbon emissions compared to coal-based thermal power and its ability to 
Sustainable dam development in India: Between global norms and local practices 
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supply peak power (TERI 2006). Realising the importance of hydropower for the national 
energy scenario, the Government of India, in collaboration with the Central Electrical Au-
thority, has initiated the preparation of preliminary feasibility studies for 162 new hydroe-
lectric schemes totalling over 50,000 MW.3  
At national level, the total hydropower potential is 148 GW, of which only 31 per cent has 
already been developed or is under construction. Arunachal Pradesh in the North-East of 
the country is to have the highest hydropower potential (GoI Central Electricity Authority 
2008). Such states as Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim in the North-East and Himachal 
Pradesh and Uttaranchal in the North are experiencing rapid development in the hydro-
power sector. The state governments have identified hydropower as an “avenue for reve-
nue generation”.4 Numerous international agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), have either con-
ducted feasibility studies (the ADB on India as a whole, the World Bank on the North-
East, both in 2007) of the possibility of harnessing hydropower in the country or have 
funded various governmental and private power development firms and parastatals. 
3 The regulatory framework for dam-related decision-making  
3.1 Dam planning and decision-making 
Under India’s Constitution water is a state responsibility, its overall governance therefore 
lying within the jurisdiction of the state governments. The Constitution also empowers the 
Union Parliament to govern interstate rivers and river valleys and arbitrate in disputes over 
interstate rivers (Iyer 2003). From an operational point of view the federal government 
plays a part in dam decision-making through its say in financial approval and statutory 
environmental and forest regulations. The decision-making process can be broken down 
into (i) the initial planning process, which is a state responsibility; (ii) statutory clearances, 
which are a federal responsibility and (iii) the post-clearance construction phase, which is 
again the state governments’ responsibility. 
(i) Initial planning process  
The initial planning process begins with the preparation of a preliminary feasibility report 
designed to identify suitable locations for dam projects and largely based on desk research. 
In most cases, this report is drawn up by the Central Electricity Authority, a federal body. 
On the basis of this report the state government concerned signs a contract with the exe-
cuting agency on the preparation of a Detailed Project Report. The Detailed Project Report 
is then sent to the federal government if it is to finance the project with unplanned alloca-
tions. Project planning then becomes a federal responsibility. 
                                                 
3 http://nhpcindia.com/English/Scripts/Hydro_Initiative.aspx, accessed 6 Aug. 2010. 
4 Personal interview with a senior official in the power department in Sikkim. 
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(ii) Statutory clearances 
Until the late 1970s, the Detailed Project Report would be sent to the Planning Commis-
sion at federal level, which undertook the techno-economic analysis before sanctioning 
any financial allocations for the project concerned. The Planning Commission then sends 
the Detailed Project Report to two federal agencies, namely the Central Electricity Author-
ity and the Central Water Commission, for techno-economic analysis. Once the report is 
cleared and has been returned to the Planning Commission, the latter forwards it for in-
vestment clearance. The preliminary analysis is carried out by the Planning Commission’s 
Project Appraisal and Management Division. Subsequently, the project is discussed by the 
Public Investment Board, an inter-ministerial body chaired by the federal Ministry of Fi-
nance. If the Public Investment Board clears the project, it is submitted to the Cabinet 
Committee of Economic Affairs for approval.  
Since the late 1970s, the Planning Commission has required that projects obtain environ-
mental clearance, which is issued by the Department of Environment. Since 1985, the fed-
eral MoEF having been formed and the Forest Conservation Act passed in 1980, the min-
istry has undertaken the statutory forest clearance and administrative environmental clear-
ance. Since 1994, when the first environmental impact assessment notification was passed, 
environmental clearance has been a statutory requirement. Administratively, forest and 
environmental clearance is undertaken in parallel with the techno-economic and invest-
ment clearances, which can take place without a forest and environmental clearance. But 
to obtain clearance from the Cabinet Committee of Economic Affairs, the project has to 
have prior environment and forest clearance.  
(iii) Post-clearance construction phase 
Once the project has been cleared, and sometimes before all the clearances have been ob-
tained, the state government signs an implementation agreement with the project devel-
oper to enable construction to proceed. During the construction phase the project devel-
oper is required to submit periodical (six-monthly) reports to the federal Ministry of Envi-
ronment and Forestry on the status of compliance with environmental impact mitigation 
requirements. 
Prior to the 1994 EIA notification, the entire dam decision-making process was an inter-
departmental affair. Since 1994, the environmental clearance process has included public 
hearings, the only form of public participation in the process. Since the 1990s the public in 
general have tried to influence decision-making by both participating in the public hearing 
process and addressing the regulatory authorities. 
3.2 Environmental Impact Assessment  
The environment became an official part of public policy and project planning in India as 
a result of India’s commitment to the United Nations Conference on Human Environment 
through its establishment of the National Committee on Environmental Planning and its 
subsequent acceptance of the committee’s recommendations. At international level, the 
panel of experts set up by the United Nations (UN) Conference on Human Environment 
argued that the environment should be the boundary condition within which development 
Sustainable dam development in India: Between global norms and local practices 
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planning is undertaken. They were particularly critical in their comments on the environ-
mental issues associated with dam (river valley) projects, whose impact would threaten 
their very purpose. In India the National Committee on Environmental Planning elabo-
rated number of intervention to be taken up at the policy and organisation level. This 
committee through their recommendations mainstreamed the environment within Indian 
policy and planning5 (Sachs 1971; EPW Correspondent 1972a; EPW Correspondent 
1972b; EPW Editorial 1987). 
3.2.1 Environmental Impact Assessment over the years 
The Environmental Impact Assessment started in India as early as the late 1970s as an 
administrative requirement for river valley projects mandated by the Planning Commis-
sion. In the early years it was undertaken by the Department of Science and Technology; 
from 1980 it was entrusted to the Department of Environment. In 1985 the Department of 
Environment and the Department of Forests were merged to form the Ministry of Envi-
ronment and Forestry. Since then this Ministry has been entrusted with environmental 
clearance (Rangacheri et al. 2000). 
Until 1994 EIA was carried out as an administrative requirement, but this changed when 
the first EIA notification was issued in 1994. EIA then had the status of subordinate legis-
lation under the Environmental Protection Act, which had already been passed in 1986. 
Between 1994 and 2006 twelve amendments were made to the original EIA Notification 
1994. These amendments gradually reduced the power of EIA Notification. More and 
more projects were exempted from EIA (Nandimath 2009). In 2006 a new EIA Notifica-
tion was passed, and this was again amended in 2009. Table 1 shows the changes that 
have occurred over the last three decades.  
In the early years, EIA was largely an interdepartmental process, with no provision for 
public participation. This period was often marked by delays in environmental clearance 
because the information sought by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry for evaluat-
ing the project would not match with the information supplied by the project authority. As 
the other parts of the project were all completed, the project had already reached the point 
of no return. Thus even if the regulatory authority was not satisfied with the environmental 
information provided by the project authority, the project would be given conditional 
clearance (Maudgal 1991; Mohan 1991). 
                                                 
5 The committee’s terms of reference included reviewing policy and programmes with significant envi-
ronmental implications, advising government, departments and industry on mitigation measures, review-
ing existing environmental legislation, regulation and administration, proposing cost-effective solutions 
to environmental problems, ensuring coordination between the environment and economic policies, pro-
moting research on environmental problems and establishing research facilities wherever possible, in-
creasing public awareness and cooperating with the UN and other international agencies in environ-
mental programmes with global concerns (EPW Correspondent 1972b). 
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Table 1: Changes in EIA regulations 
 1980–1994 1994 2006 2009ff. 
Events EIA becomes part of 
decision making on 
water resource pro-
jects 
First EIA  
Notification 
Second EIA Notifi-
cation revoking the 
first  
Draft EIA Notifica-
tion currently being 
finalised 
Main actors Dept of Science and 
Technology and later 
Dept of  
Environment 
Ministry of  
Environment and 
Forestry 
Ministry of  
Environment and  
Forestry 
Ministry of  
Environment and 
Forestry 
Triggers for 
change 
Required by Plan-
ning Commission, 
Govt of India 
Environmental Pro-
tection Act 1986 
Govindrajan Com-
mittee Report rec-
ommending reforms 
to attract foreign 
direct investment 
Expert committee 
report of Dept of 
Economic Affairs, 
Ministry of Finance 
Influence of 
international 
actors 
Required by multi-
lateral financial insti-
tutions 
 World Bank’s Envi-
ronmental Capacity 
Building TA Pro-
gram 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
After 1994, with EIA now subordinate legislation, amendments could be made by bypass-
ing the parliament, which resulted in twelve amendments over a period of ten years. The 
subsequent amendments to the 1994 EIA Notification resulted in more and more projects 
being exempted from EIA (Nandimath 2009). But by then the environmental clearance 
process had already been identified by part of the government machinery and industry as 
an obstacle to the efficient implementation of projects. Civil society also criticised the 
environmental clearance process as not being conducive to sound environmental decision- 
making. This led to a couple of events after 2000.  
First, the World Bank undertook specific activities with a view to strengthening the minis-
try’s environmental clearance process as part of the ongoing Environmental Capacity 
Building Technical Assistance project. The aim of this project was to improve the quality 
of environmental information and strengthen the EIA process (World Bank 2004).  
Secondly, a committee chaired by V. Govindrajan (hence the name Govindrajan Commit-
tee), the then secretary of industrial policy, was set up to suggest ways of attracting more 
foreign direct investment to India and to undertake necessary institutional reforms to this 
end (Nandimath 2009). The committee pointed to the long time taken by environmental 
clearance, which caused lengthy delays in projects. To ensure speedy environmental clear-
ance as required by the environmental regulations, the Govindarajan Committee recom-
mended that the MoEF should consider setting up a central data centre to serve as a one-
stop source of reliable and validated environmental information for the preparation of En-
vironmental Impact Assessments. 
On 11 December 2002 the cabinet secretary announced that the Govindrajan Committee’s 
report had been accepted for implementation by the Government of India (Mukherjee 
2002). On 16 August 2004 a draft EIA Notification was posted on the MoEF’s website 
and was followed by four rounds of consultations with federal ministries, state govern-
Sustainable dam development in India: Between global norms and local practices 
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ments and civil society organisations (Nandimath 2009). However, many civil society 
organisations and people’s organisations were not able to take part in this consultation 
process, and environmentalists also alleged that the final version of the Notification was 
discussed with the industrial associations at the behest of the Prime Minister’s Office 
(Menon / Kohli 2008).  
The draft drew around 500 responses from individuals, research institutes, industry, indus-
trial associations, central government and state government ministries, social activists and 
non-governmental organisations. It came in for severe criticism from civil society organi-
sations and activists on the ground that the re-engineering process and environmental deci-
sion-making had been guided by the desire for industrial growth rather than genuine con-
cern for the environment (Saldanha et al. 2007). A civil society initiative also undertook 
political mobilisation by involving various parliamentarians across the political spectrum 
and members of special parliamentary committees. Finally, on 14 September 2006, the 
MoEF introduced the 2006 EIA Notification (Saldanha et al. 2007; Menon / Kohli 2007; 
2008).  
The 2006 EIA Notification struck a fine balance between the competing interests of dif-
ferent stakeholders, but in the end it did not satisfy anybody. Industry and part of the gov-
ernment continued to complain about delays, perceiving EIA as a hurdle to be surmounted 
before marathon project inception processes could be launched; the activists continued to 
complain about the EIA’s lack of ability to ensure that sound environmental decisions 
were made. 
On 10 November 2008 the Department of Economic Affairs of the Ministry of Finance 
formed an expert group to examine the patterns followed by statutory clearances for indus-
trial and infrastructure projects in India. The expert group included representatives of the 
Infrastructure Leasing and Finance Corporation, the Infrastructure Development Finance 
Company, the India Infrastructure Finance Company, such industrial associations as the 
Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India, the Confederation of Indian 
Industry and the Federation of Indian Chambers and Commerce and the Industry Advisor 
of the Planning Commission and the Joint Secretary to the Department of Industrial Policy 
and Promotion, Government of India. The Confederation of Indian Industry was repre-
sented by the Chief Executive Officer of the Indian section of the World Wildlife Fund for 
Nature. 
The expert group focused on the ten federal government clearances, the first and most 
important of which concerned the environment. The report pointed out that, more often 
than not, the environmental and forest clearances resulted in inordinate delays, causing 
cost overruns and affecting project economics. The expert group recommended that the 
process of public hearing should be streamlined, that the public hearing process be sepa-
rated from state pollution control boards and that a strict time limit be imposed for the 
issue of environmental clearance, after which the project would be deemed to have been 
cleared (GoI Ministry of Finance 2008). 
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3.2.2 The 1994 and 2006 EIA Notifications: comparing their contents 
As the preceding section has shown, in the last one and half decades EIA has come under 
pressure from various actors with diverse and often contradictory interests. Civil society 
continued to argue for developmental activity with a minimum environmental impact, as 
espoused by the UN Convention on Human Environment in the early 1970s. The EIA was 
also a tool which could be used to oppose large water infrastructure projects on environ-
mental grounds. However, the macroeconomic scenario prevailing in the country had 
changed, and under the policy of liberalisation the focus was very much on improving the 
economic parameters and encouraging private capital. What mattered under this regime 
was that steps were taken to ensure the rapid implementation of projects and to create 
conditions that led to minimum delays for project developers. The years after 2000 thus 
saw a streamlining of the EIA process, which came to be viewed more as a constraint than 
a tool for promoting developmental goals with a minimum environmental impact. 
In the case of river valley and hydropower projects EIA continued to be obligatory, but 
provision was made for a certain category of projects to be exempted from the EIA re-
quirement (Nandimath 2009; Menon / Kohli 2009). In terms of efficiency, the 2006 EIA 
Notification was an improvement on the 1994 EIA Notification in that it decentralised the 
process of granting environmental clearances by transferring some of the projects to the 
State Level Environment Impact Agency. But, in reality, most of the states could not form 
a State Level Environment Impact Agency, and the projects which had been transferred to 
the states reverted to the MoEF. 
Ideally, EIA is an instrument that enables the course of action with the least environmental 
impact to be chosen from among the various sets of possible interventions. Thus, in one 
sense, EIA per se can be seen as promoting the comprehensive assessment of various op-
tions. The 1994 EIA Notification included a provision concerning site clearance, meaning 
that the site chosen for the project had first to be approved by the regulatory authority on 
the basis of first-level impact assessment and only after the project had obtained site 
clearance could a detailed EIA be undertaken as the basis for environmental clearance. 
Intuitively the site clearance process ensured some form of assessing options for project 
location. 
The 2006 EIA Notification broke up the environmental clearance process into screening, 
scoping, public consultation and appraisal. This was a positive change in the sense that the 
scoping phase would then define the project developer’s terms of reference, ensuring bet-
ter structuring of the report, comprehensive environmental and social information and also 
a reduction in the frequency with which fresh information needed to be provided at the 
request of the assessment agency. In the 1994 EIA Notification the environment clearance 
was issued in stages. One of the stages was issuing of site clearance. Post site clearance 
the project would undertake detailed study for assessing environmental impacts. Through 
this site clearance provision some kind of option assessment was inbuilt in the system, in 
terms of choosing optimal sites for construction of the project in accordance with the envi-
ronmental impact of the project. However, the 2006 EIA Notification does not require a 
comprehensive option assessment to be undertaken at any point of the environmental  
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Table 2: Comparison of the 1994 and 2006 EIA Notifications  
Issues 1994 EIA Notification  2006 EIA Notification  
Coverage and scope Subsequent amendments of the notifi-
cation ensured that any new project 
costing less than US$ 20 million or 
modernisation project costing less than 
US$ 10 million would be exempted 
from EIA. 
To fasten the clearance process, EIA 
decision-making was decentralised 
(certain categories of project were 
transferred to state level). Project de-
velopers were allowed to secure land 
prior to clearance without defining the 
land to be secured.6 
Comprehensive option 
assessment  
 
Site clearance hints at option assess-
ment on the basis not of technology 
but of location. 
Site clearance and final clearance now 
replaced with four stages, namely 
screening, scoping, public consultation 
and appraisal. No comprehensive op-
tion assessment.  
Decision-making  
 
EIA reports to be assessed by impact 
assessment agency in consultation 
with an expert committee drawn from 
different subject domains and areas of 
interest, including resettlement experts 
and representatives of civil society. 
In reality, expert appraisal committee 
has been gradually deprived of repre-
sentatives of civil society and of well-
known conservationist and environ-
mental experts; they have been replaced 
with retired technocrats.  
Public participation  
 
Any interested person can participate in 
public hearings and submit oral / writ-
ten comments. Later amendments ex-
empted modernization projects from 
public hearings. 
Public hearing process detailed, but 
participation narrowed down to only 
people affected, and hearing can take 
place even if very few people attend.  
Compliance and  
monitoring  
Empowered the expert committee to 
undertake site visits before, during and 
after clearance for physical verifica-
tion of compliance report.  
Empowers expert appraisal committee 
to undertake site visits before and dur-
ing issue of clearance. Silent on post- 
clearance monitoring. 
Sanctions  
 
Project liable to cancellation if insuffi-
cient or inadequate data submitted 
more than once. 
Penalties for providing false or incor-
rect information, but only if it is proved 
that the mistake is deliberate. 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
clearance process. Nor do the terms of reference defined during the scoping phase make 
any reference to the assessment of options or seek specific information on alternative op-
tions. Only the summary EIA document would mention about option assessment, but no 
more than lip service. 
The 2006 EIA Notification was superior to the 1994 version in terms of details of the pub-
lic hearing process, but it also narrows down the range of people able to attend public 
hearings. The 1994 Notification permitted anyone to participate, but in 2006 this was re-
duced to local people directly affected. The 2006 Notification is silent on the participation 
of civil society organisations in public hearings, in contrast to the 1994 Notification. As 
the participation of civil society organisations might have been a threat to project decision-
                                                 
6 This provision is not clear to the author. Many policy documents in India suffer from such ambiguities, 
resulting in different interpretations, which can then be contested in court. 
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making if they were to raise unpleasant questions, their participation was restricted. The 
modernisation of irrigation projects was exempted from the EIA requirement, and public 
hearings could take place even without a quorum. All these changes were made on the 
pretext of speeding up the public hearing process. 
The 2006 EIA Notification does not make post-clearance on-site monitoring mandatory. 
There have always been complaints of projects failing to comply with the environmental 
management plans mandated in environmental clearance certificates (Roy 2008). The 
1994 EIA Notification had already provided for heavy sanctions. In the 2006 EIA Notifi-
cation the sanctions were diluted in the sense that those which had automatically followed 
the provision of false information were now imposed at the discretion of the regulatory 
authority and then only if it was proved that the project authority had deliberately provided 
incorrect information. 
3.3 Regulations for resettlement and rehabilitation, and practices 
With independence in 1947, India entered what is often known as the Nehruvian Era, 
when the main focus was on technology-driven industrialisation, which was expected to 
trickle down to ensure social equity (Guha 2007). During this era the normative impor-
tance of dams was high within Indian polity (Klingensmith 2006). Dam projects were 
mostly seen as engineering projects and were implemented by engineers who enjoyed high 
esteem. These projects were often seen as tools for developing the otherwise backward 
sections of the population, with particular emphasis on tribal people (D’Monte 1984). The 
resettlement of displaced people and environmental impacts were not considered in the 
planning and decision-making process, which was dominated by the engineers (Iyer 2007; 
Mohanty 2005). Land for projects was requisitioned under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, 
which empowered the government to appropriate private land on the principle of eminent 
domain for public purpose. The Act and particularly the concepts of ‘eminent domain’ and 
‘public purpose’ have been criticised over the years, but the overall structure of the Act 
has remained unchanged.  
It is generally agreed that dams have displaced many people, especially in tribal areas, but 
the estimate of the total number displaced varies between 32 and 56 million (Rangacheri et 
al. 2000; Fernandes 2004; Roy 1999). The World Bank also sees India as one of the prob-
lem cases as far as development-induced displacement is concerned. According to some 
estimates, India accounted for more than 50 per cent of development-induced displace-
ment in all World Bank projects between 1986 and 1993 (Fox / Brown 1998). 
3.3.1 Towards a national resettlement policy 
In the early decades after independence, when dams were equated with development and 
displacement was seen as an unavoidable cost that the country must pay for it, there was 
some institutional thinking and learning within the apparatus of the Government of India  
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Table 3: Early displacement and resettlement regulations 
Year 1967 1967 1985 1986 
Actor 17-member commit-
tee set up by Ministry 
of Food, Agriculture, 
Community Devel-
opment and Coopera-
tion 
T. N. Singh Committee of Depart-
ment of Welfare in 
Home Ministry 
Standing Committee 
on Public Enterprises 
Issue Study on basic issues 
of Land Acquisition 
Act 1894 
Compensation of 
families displaced by 
public projects (T. N. 
Singh Formula) 
Rehabilitation of 
tribal population 
Review of T. N. 
Singh Formula 
Implication Requisition of good 
agricultural land to be 
avoided and rehabili-
tation as moral com-
pulsion of the state 
One member of the 
family would be em-
ployed in the project 
Rehabilitation policy 
binding on project 
developer 
T. N. Singh Formula 
abandoned 
 
Source: Based on Fernandes / Paranjpye 1997 
(Table 4). The earliest public policy governing displacement was the T. N. Singh Formula, 
which called for the employment in the project of one member of every family it dis-
placed. Thus some form of employment-based compensation was already being consid- 
ered as early as the 1960s. But, with time, the number of displaced families increased and 
projects became more technology-intensive. With the decline in industry’s absorption ca-
pacity, the T. N. Singh Formula was abandoned in 1986 (Fernandes / Paranjpye 1997). 
Iyer (2007, 3103), a senior government official in the 1980s, observed that:  
“Sometime during the 1980s thinking began in the Government of India on the formu-
lation of a policy to govern all future cases of displacement. (...) The subject was dis-
cussed many times in the interministerial meetings at the level of secretaries, and at 
meetings of groups of ministers.” 
The late 1980s and the 1990s were also a time of considerable controversy in India over 
the Narmada projects, and particularly the Sardar Sarovar Project, which subsequently 
became international. In the late 1970s the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, a quasi-
judicial body formed under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act 1960, had decided that 
anyone who could prove ownership of agricultural land in the submerged area should re-
ceive land in compensation. This decision by the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal was 
an important landmark for land-for-land compensation in India. But it concerned only 
land-owners. The people who were dependent on land without possessing the legal recog-
nised titles, or were dependent on common property resources or on providing service to 
the rural population for their livelihoods were not covered by the land-for-land compensa-
tion principle. 
These drawbacks and the faulty implementation of the resettlement policies in various 
states in which the Narmada project was located led to the formation of a national and 
subsequently transnational civil society movement, which eventually forced the with-
drawal of the World Bank, which was funding the Sardar Sarovar. The Government of 
India and the state government of Gujarat went ahead with the financing and construction 
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of the dam. The transnational and national campaign failed to stop the dam, and the re-
forms affecting this project also had little spill-over effects on other projects. However, 
there were two achievements worthy of note. First, the Narmada controversy resulted in 
the development of a civil society network, which became increasingly broad, powerful 
and critical of dam construction in India in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, it sparked a 
critical debate on how future dams should be built in the country and on how past dam 
development had impacted on different sections of the population.7  
By the late 1980s civil society in India had organised itself and voiced its demand for a 
proper resettlement policy. It formed a National Working Group consisting of researchers, 
academics, social activists, individuals and people affected by the project and drafted a 
prototype policy known as the National Policy on Developmental Resettlement of Project- 
Affected People. This became the basic policy for the civil society network’s subsequent 
engagement with the government in the early and mid 1990s, when different ministries of 
the Government of India drafted a series of resettlement policies, which never actually 
materialised into a practical policy. Civil society engaged with the ministries in discussion 
on most of these draft policies and put forward their own, which was based on the princi-
ples espoused in the National Policy on Developmental Resettlement of Project-Affected 
People (Fernandes 2008, 5–6). 
In 1998, the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment in the Government of India submit-
ted another draft policy entitled National Policy Packages and Guidelines for Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation and, in the same year, a draft amendment to the Land Acquisition Act 
1894 known as the Land Acquisition Bill was also prepared. In a bid to reform both the 
policy and the Act governing land appropriation the civil society alliance engaged with the 
government again. 
Table 4: Evolution of a national resettlement and rehabilitation policy 
Year 1994–95 1995 1998 2004 2007 
Title Draft National 
Policy on Reset-
tlement and 
Rehabilitation 
Draft National 
Policy on People 
Affected by Res-
ervoir Project 
Draft National 
Policy on Reset-
tlement and 
Rehabilitation 
National Policy 
on Resettlement 
and Rehabili-
tation 
National Reset-
tlement and Re-
habilitation  
Policy 
Leading actor Ministry of Ru-
ral Development 
Ministry of Water 
Resources 
Ministry of 
Rural Areas and 
Employment 
Ministry of 
Rural Devel-
opment 
Ministry of Rural 
Development 
Other influ-
ential actors 
Civil society 
alliance at na-
tional level 
 Civil society 
alliance at na-
tional level 
 National Devel-
opment Council, 
civil society 
alliance 
International 
actors 
Multilateral 
financial institu-
tions 
 Multilateral 
financial institu-
tions 
  
Source: Author’s own compilation based on Fernandes / Paranjpye 1997 and Fernandes 2008 
 
                                                 
7 For more information on Narmada, see Wood 2007; Dwivedi 2006 and Khagram 2004. 
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According to Fernandes (2008, 6):  
“A meeting convened by the Minister for Rural Development in January 1999 ended 
with an unwritten understanding that a policy would be prepared first in consultation 
with civil society groups and that a law would then be drafted based on the principles 
it enunciated. However, the Union Cabinet reportedly rejected the policy in October 
1999 and approved Land Acquisition Bill 1998 that attempted to reduce the already 
limited rights of the DP/PAPs (Displaced People /Project Affected People, added by 
author) under the Land Acquisition Act. The Government fell shortly after it.”  
By this time the global process of the formation and then operation of the World Commis-
sion on Dams had begun. One of the commissioners on the WCD was a leading civil soci-
ety activist and the leader of the Narmada movement. Civil society at both domestic and 
international level was well organised and articulate and was able to contribute its learning 
and decisions to the WCD.8 The WCD report published in 2000 was rejected outright by 
the Ministry of Water Resources in the Government of India. The rejection was so 
strongly worded that, to some extent, it temporarily derailed the mutual learning process, 
the progressive interaction and the gradual progress achieved in the various drafts of the 
National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policies in the 1990s. To quote Iyer (2007, 
3104): 
“Two decades of slow emergence of enlightened thinking were washed out in the 
flood of rhetoric against what was perceived as an international conspiracy to pre-
vent India from developing.” 
In 2003, however, the Ministry of Rural Development put forward the first National Pol-
icy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project-Affected Families, which was notified 
in 2004. This policy relaunched civil society activism, and there was considerable interac-
tion between civil society and parts of the government machinery. Another round of in-
tense debate thus followed, and many seminars and conferences were held (Cernea 2006; 
Iyer 2007). This period of debates, discussions, conferences, workshops and seminars re-
sulted in the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of 2007. 
3.3.2 National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy 2007: analysis of its contents 
One of the main aims of the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy 2007 was to 
minimise displacement by specifying various causes to be avoided when the location of a 
project was being chosen. It also considers comprehensive option assessment, calling on 
state governments to undertake comprehensive site and technology assessment before de-
ciding on a project. This contrasts sharply with the old draft policies, in which minimising 
displacement was either not mentioned or was ill-defined. The policy also referred to the 
need for social impact assessment, which was missing from the earlier draft policies and 
which civil society had always argued for. The national policy is based on such principles 
as participation, sustained income generation and improvement of the living standards of 
the displaced population. It provides for the preparation of resettlement action plans in con-
sultation with village institutions. To ensure sustained income generation, the policy re-
                                                 
8 For international mobilisation, see McCully 2001 and Khagram 2004; for domestic social mobilisation, 
see Fernandes 2008 and Iyer 2007. 
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quires the affected population to be offered shares in the project in partial compensation to 
ensure ownership of the project for which they have had to sacrifice their assets (Table 5).  
Although the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy 2007 contained numerous 
positive provisions, it did not make them binding on the project developer or the govern-
ment. Most of the above provisions were subject to the discretion of the government or 
project developer concerned, the wording used including such terms as “may”, “to the 
extent possible” or “if government land is available in the resettlement area”. Singh (2006, 
5308) argues that: “Perhaps such an approach allows greater flexibility, however past ex-
perience conclusively establishes that such flexibility is invariably used against the inter-
ests of the displaced people” Similarly, although it mentions social impact assessment, it 
fails to explain how it will be carried out, by whom, at what stage of the project cycle and 
what impact it will have in project decision-making. 
Although the Government of India rejected the WCD report, a critical examination of its 
contents reveals that many of its provisions have found their way into national policy. At 
the same time, that policy has struck a fine balance between competing interests. Thus the 
implementation of the positive provisions has either been left with some loose ends or has 
been left to the discretion of the relevant governmental institutions or the project devel-
oper. 
4 Dam decision-making in practice: the Allain Duhangan, Lower 
Subansiri and Dibang Multipurpose Dam Projects  
This section investigates individual projects in order to arrive at an understanding of the 
process by which superior social and environmental standards become part of project 
Table 5: National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy 2007 
Issue National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy 2007 
Minimising displacement Makes pragmatic suggestions, e.g. acquisition of certain categories 
of land should be avoided, but left to the discretion of the project 
authority. 
Comprehensive option assessment Calls for option assessment based on alternative sites and choice of 
technology, but subject to discretion of the government concerned. 
No implementation structure proposed. 
Pattern of compensation Better standard of living and sustained income for affected people 
through shares in companies and land compensation at replacement 
cost. 
Public participation Resettlement action plan in consultation with people and village 
governance institutions, but no mention of the nature of consultation. 
Whether the affected people are to be informed or options and accep-
tance sought from them is not clear. 
Social impact assessment Social impact assessment to be carried out, and mitigation plans 
mentioned, but silence on how the assessment would take place and 
on its role in project decision-making. 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
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planning and practice. The case studies were chosen purposely to see whether superior 
norms, such as one recommended by the World Commission on Dams, have actually had 
any impact on various actors at project level. It was therefore decided to focus on those 
projects where the largest part of the planning, clearance and construction of a hydropower 
project has taken place since 2000. Three hydropower projects, namely the Allain Duhan-
gan Hydropower Project in Himachal Pradesh, the Lower Subansiri Project on the Assam-
Arunachal Pradesh border and the Dibang Multipurpose Project in Arunachal Pradesh 
were selected for the case studies. The projects differ with regard to (i) the presence or 
absence of international funding (ii) private or public project development agency and (iii) 
the current status of the project (planning stage / clearance stage / construction stage). 
Figure 1: Map of India with dam project sites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com/free-download/free-download-india-political-maps.html,  
accessed 28 July 2010 
Allain Duhangan Project 
Dibang Multipurpose Project 
Lower Subansiri Project 
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Table 6: The dam projects investigated at a glance 
Name of the project Allain Duhangan Lower Subansiri Dibang Multipurpose 
Project developer Private  Public  Public 
Current status Advanced stage of 
construction 
Construction stage Clearance stage 
Major project purpose Hydropower Hydropower Hydropower and flood  
control 
Capacity (MW) 192 2,000 3,000 
International actors International Finance 
Corporation 
./. ./. 
Nature of the project Run-of-river hydro-
plant 
Run-of-river hydro-
plant 
Reservoir  
Dam height (m) 14.5 130 288 
Reservoir area (km2) 0.02 33.5 40.09 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment 
EIA study repeated in 
2003 
EIA study carried out 
in 2001 
EIA study carried out 
in 2007 
Major issue of conten-
tion 
Downstream impact Downstream impact Dam-induced dis-
placement and down-
stream impact 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
4.1 The Allain Duhangan Dam Project 
The Allain Duhangan project is being developed by Allain Duhangan Hydro Power Lim-
ited. Stratkraft Norfund Power Limited of Norway and the International Finance Corpora-
tion have equity and debt participation in the project. By 2003 the project had obtained 
techno-economic clearance from the Central Electricity Authority and forest and environ-
mental clearances from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. The project authority 
also possessed letters from the village governance institutions (panchayat), giving their 
consent to the project. The project was then submitted to the IFC for funding in 2003. This 
was the first time since the Narmada debacle that the World Bank Group (the IFC being its 
private wing) had been called upon to finance a dam-reservoir project.  
When the EIA report on the project appeared on the IFC’s website as part of its project 
disclosure policy, various civil society organisations complained to the IFC that the EIA 
was not available in their local language. This was a violation of the IFC’s own mandate. 
The IFC translated the report and uploaded it on to its website. On the basis of these 
documents the non-governmental organisations discussed with the people the facts given 
in the EIA report and also told them about the implications of the project. This was fol-
lowed by a series of letters sent to the World Bank and the IFC both by the local populace 
and by the civil society organisations claiming that the EIA report was faulty and that 
there had been no involvement of local people in its preparation. This delayed the IFC 
Board meeting held to take a decision on the Allain Duhangan project. A meeting between 
the project developer, IFC staff and representatives of the local community subsequently 
took place. It involved negotiation and persuasion. But both tactics failed, and the local 
people again wrote to IFC headquarters to describe the course taken by the meeting. The 
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civil society organisations who were leading the local movement then forwarded a detailed 
critique of the EIA report and demanded that a fresh EIA be undertaken. The IFC agreed 
to this suggestion and subsequently prepared an addendum to the existing EIA report 
(South Asia Network of Dams Rivers and People, personal communication June 2009; 
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman 2004).  
By now the civil society organisations were demanding that the public hearing be arranged 
by an independent panel mutually appointed by the campaigning parties. They also de-
manded that the decision taken at the public hearing be binding on the project developer. 
The IFC agreed only to the former demand and set up an independent panel to conduct a 
fresh public hearing. A team from the Kalpvriksh Environmental Action Group analysed 
the EIA report and undertook a pre-hearing exercise before the actual public hearing was 
held. This ensured that local people understood the report and were also able to articulate 
informed comments to the project developer. In the process the Kalpvriksh team also 
shared their analysis with the local people and independently sent their response to the 
World Bank. According to Kalpvriksh, this approach was commendable, since the people 
attending most public hearings in the country knew little about the project and were also 
largely unaware of their rights and responsibilities at public hearings (Kalpvriksh, personal 
communication June 2009). 
Subsequently, the project developer agreed to compensate local people for the loss of ri-
parian rights where the quality and quantity of surface and ground water were affected by 
the implementation of the project by making necessary alternative arrangements to meet 
local water demand. The project developer and the villagers of Prini signed a memoran-
dum of understanding specifying that the cash compensation for the land requisitioned for 
the project would be paid at higher than the market rate; that one member of the land-
owner’s family would be offered employment; that the hospital constructed during the 
project would also act as the primary health centre for the village of Prini and that the 
company would provide pastureland for the people of the villages of Hamta and Chalet 
when constructing the approach road to the Allain Barrage. At the same meeting the com-
pany also agreed with the Prini village governance institution that, during the construction 
and subsequent operation of the project, the traditional source of irrigation water in the 
villages would not be tampered with and that a grievance cell would be set up at project 
level (ADHPL 2004). But besides Prini, there was another village downstream that was 
affected by the project, namely Jagatsukh.  
The Allain Duhangan Project has affected Jagatsukh and Prini in different ways. As the 
powerhouse and office complex for the project had to be built in Prini, a large area of land 
was requisitioned there. Land in Jagatsukh was taken to build the approach road to the 
Duhangan Weir. But the greatest loss for Jagatsukh was access to the River Duhangan, 
which was diverted into the River Allain by the weir, upstream from the village. Accord-
ing to the villagers in Jagatsukh, much of their livelihood was dependent on the Duhangan 
and its tributaries. Agriculture in Jagatsukh consisted predominantly of apple orchards (in 
the uplands) and rice (flat lowlands), the water for which had been obtained from the 
River Duhangan along traditional irrigation channels. In addition, the source of drinking 
water in Jagatsukh was a spring, which the people feared would dry up with the construc-
tion and tunnelling upstream. They therefore opposed the project, and the Jagatsukh vil-
lage assembly unanimously passed a resolution rejecting the no-objection certificate and 
opposing the project (Correspondent 2004). 
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On 15 September 2004 local villagers wrote to the IFC’s Office of the Compliance Advi-
sor Ombudsman, criticising the proposed IFC funding of the project. They complained 
that the EIA documents were flawed, that the public hearing had been based on faulty EIA 
reports and that people could not, in such circumstances, decide whether the project 
should go ahead (International Rivers 2004a, b). Despite the protest at project level and 
although one of the independent public hearing regulators wrote to the IFC objecting to 
the approval of the project (International Rivers 2004c), the project was submitted to the 
IFC Board and approved on 12 October 2004. Thus, the resistance to the project ended 
prior to its approval. 
The project was launched, but attempts to influence the decision-making continued. By 
this time the movement was led by the village of Jagatsukh, which had meanwhile formed 
a community-based organisation known as Dhomiya Ganga Sangharsh Samiti. The villag-
ers filed a lawsuit with the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, complaining that the project 
affected their basic right to survival, since it would threaten the availability of water, the 
absence of which would threaten their lives and livelihoods. The court appointed a high-
powered committee to see if the minimum downstream water release from the project was 
enough for the village of Jagatsukh. The committee appointed by the court calculated the 
water required by Jagatsukh for drinking and domestic purposes and for consumption by 
livestock. At its request, the court appointed experts to calculate the water needed for irri-
gation purposes. The project had meanwhile promised to release 150 lit/sec. downstream 
water flows, whereas Jagatsukh required 350 lit/sec.  
The agitation by the villagers of Jagatsukh continued and even went so far as to prevent 
the project developer’s employees from working. This time the project developer filed a 
lawsuit against the agitators and asked the court to provide sufficient security for the pro-
ject to continue. The court agreed, and works on the project resumed. 
Meanwhile, the IFC’s Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman made periodic visits 
to the site in an attempt to resolve the differences between the two parties through dia-
logue. According to the 2006 report of the Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombuds-
man, the onset of work and the award of contracts to local villagers in the area restored 
something like peace between the two groups. In 2004 and 2005 a series of meetings were 
held in Prini and Jagatsukh in the presence of the local administration to enable the villag-
ers and the project developer to negotiate. This resulted in a further increase in the cash 
compensation for the requisitioned land. However, some people in Jagatsukh were still 
demanding that the project be stopped. During their various visits to the area the represen-
tatives of the Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman ensured that the grievance 
redressal mechanism had begun to function and also recommended a formal channel of 
communication between the opposing groups with a view to developing mutual trust. 
In February 2007 a committee was formed by the state government to consider whether 
the forest clearance had been violated by the project authority. The committee reported 
that there has been ‘continuous and unabated violations of’ various environmental and 
forest Acts (emphasis quoted from the Civil Writ Petition 2007 noted by Himachal 
Pradesh High Court). It was alleged in the report that all this had happened despite re-
peated notices / directions from the Forest Department and State Pollution Control Board. 
As a result of the violations of forest rules the project authority was fined 59.5 million 
rupees by the Forest Department for felling or damaging trees, dumping waste, diverting 
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forest land to other uses without the necessary approval of the MoEF and causing damage 
to forests. 
On the basis of this report and the show-cause notice issued by the state government, 
Dhomya Ganga Sangharsh Samiti filed another lawsuit in the Himachal Pradesh High 
Court and obtained a temporary injunction on the project. The project developer immedi-
ately appealed to the High Court against the injunction. On 26 September 2007 the High 
Court stated in its interim order that, if it was proved that the project developer was no 
longer violating the rules and was complying with the directions issued by the state gov-
ernment, the injunction could be lifted in view of the importance of the project. The pro-
ject developer had told the court that the project was scheduled for completion in June 
2008 and that a stay order would result in a delay. The court therefore set up another 
committee of experts, comprising representatives of the district administration and senior 
officials of the Forest Department, Public Works Department, State Electricity Board, De-
partment of Environment and Pollution Control Board to decide on the injunction. This 
committee was asked to undertake a site visit within three days and to draw up a report 
within a week. It was empowered by the court to lift the injunction if it saw fit. In its re-
port of 19 November 2007 the committee of experts gave the project developer clearance 
to continue the work on the Allain side of the project and on the Duhangan side until a 
certain point, beyond which that work was to be restricted to environmental and forest 
stabilisation, such as the stabilisation of slopes and the development of dumping sites and 
pastureland. This decision proved that violations of the forest clearance provisions had 
continued in some areas.  
Currently, the project is still under construction, the cost has escalated, and the company 
has had to ask for an increase in the IFC loan, which has been granted. Part of the project 
was scheduled to be operational in 2009, but it has been delayed. Meanwhile, the agitators 
have appealed against the court order and called for judicial arbitration. 
4.2 The Lower Subansiri Dam Project 
The Lower Subansiri Project is located on the River Subansiri, one of the major tributaries 
of the River Brahmaputra. As early as April 1983, the Brahmaputra Board, a river basin 
agency responsible to the Ministry of Water Resources, undertook a detailed survey and 
investigation work for a 4,800 MW Subansiri Dam. However, the project could not be 
implemented because of the project of such a magnitude was supposed to submerge a 
large area in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. The Brahmaputra Board then carried out a 
fresh survey and narrowed the choice down to three sites for three projects on the River 
Subansiri. One of the dam sites was located right on the border between Arunachal 
Pradesh and Assam. The dam, powerhouse and the storage reservoir were to remain in 
Arunachal Pradesh, while the office and colony would be sited in Assam, the lower ripar-
ian state. In 1998–1999 the Brahmaputra Board began drawing up the detailed project re-
port on the Subansiri Lower Dam, with completion scheduled for 2000. It was not com-
pleted on time, and in 2000 the Ministry of Water Resources transferred the project to the 
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), an undertaking run by the Govern-
ment of India (NHPC 2002). This was one of the first large dam projects anywhere in the 
north-eastern region of the country, whose power potential had no previously been har-
nessed, but which had nevertheless always being regarded as the powerhouse of India. 
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By mid-2001 the EIA report on the Lower Subansiri Project was ready, and the public 
hearing was due to take place in September. In line with the 1994 provision the summary 
EIA report was made available to the general public. On the basis of the summary report 
the Kalpvriksh Environmental Action Group, a national civil society organisation, criti-
cised the EIA report and demanded tough action against the project developer. The criti-
cism was that, though the project was yet to receive necessary forest and environmental 
clearance, the project developer had proceeded with the construction of the project hous-
ing and so violated the Forest Conservation Act 1980 and the Environmental Protection 
Act 1986. A further cause of the criticism was that the project area was a high conserva-
tion area recognised by the Wildlife Institute of India and Birdlife International. The EIA 
summary report was also criticised for undermining the environmental importance of the 
project area and for data discrepancies.  
In September 2001 the public hearing on the project took place. This was one of the first 
large hydropower projects in the North East, and the people in the area were also unfamil-
iar with the public hearing process. The hearing was later criticised by Aranyak, a local-
level environmental non-governmental organization represented at the hearing, for proce-
dural violations, unsatisfactory answers and unanswered questions (Vagholikar / Ahmed 
2003). The proposal was, however, submitted to the expert appraisal committee, which 
gave environmental clearance in November 2002. Meanwhile, representatives of Aranyak 
approached the Supreme Court alleging that, as part of the Tale Valley Wildlife Sanctuary 
was being flooded, the project required the prior approval of the Supreme Court, which 
appointed the Indian Board for Wildlife. Studies were subsequently carried out and pre-
sented to the Indian Board for Wildlife in May 2003. The project was cleared subject to 
stringent conditions, one of which was that no further projects upstream from the Lower 
Subansiri Project would be allowed in the future and that the entire catchment area of the 
Subansiri Dam would be declared a national park. The project developer was also ordered 
to pay the entire cost of resettling and rehabilitating the people displaced from the national 
park (Chatradhar 2009). 
On 15 June 2003 the first local-level mobilisation took place in the form of a mass meet-
ing organised by the All Mishing Student Union in the Gogamukh project area. The meet-
ing discussed the project and its EIA report in the context of the report of the World 
Commission on Dams. An appeal was made for a second public hearing, given that people 
had not been aware of the one held in 2001, since it had been announced in an English-
language newspaper that was not circulated in the area. Nor had people been properly in-
formed in the EIA report of the downstream impact of the project or of the failure of the 
project to comply with the requirements laid down by the World Commission on Dams. 
Those attending the meeting demanded the abandonment of the Lower Subansiri Project in 
its current form, given the geological fragility of the Eastern Himalayas, calling instead for 
the construction of a smaller, eco-friendly dam (Menon / Kohli 2005, 201). Copies of the 
minutes of this meeting were sent to the regulatory authority and to the project developer. 
Despite this Lower Subansiri Project received environmental clearance from the MoEF on 
16 July 2003 subject to certain conditions.  
The conditional environmental clearance is difficult to interpret. While it gives the project 
environmental clearance and permits work to go ahead, it also calls on the project devel-
oper to undertake studies of the impact of the project on aquatic fauna, biodiversity and 
habitat conservation falling within the project submerged area (Chatradhar 2009). Ideally, 
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these studies should have formed part of the EIA report, on the basis of which the project 
was to have been appraised. But by giving clearance and at the same time asking for more 
studies, the MoEF seemed to be indicating that, whatever happened, the project should 
and would proceed, the studies being undertaken more to legitimise environmental clear-
ance. Thus such studies are not just collections of scientific facts but political tools used 
for instrumental purposes. 
By September 2004 a local community-based institution in the area downstream from the 
Lower Subansiri Project, the People’s Movement for Subansiri Brahmaputra Valley 
(PMSBV) was already vehemently opposing the project. Along with other local civil soci-
ety organizations, it arranged a meeting in Arunachal Pradesh, at which both the Assam 
and Arunachal Pradesh State Pollution Control Boards and the project developer were 
criticised for their unwillingness to address the concerns of the downstream population 
(Chatradhar 2009). 
While the project developer was going ahead with the construction, the agitation at local 
level was gaining ground. The PMSBV was also becoming more popular among the local 
masses and broadening its base by forging relations with other local-level issue-based or 
mass-based organisations. At national level such civil society organisations as Kalpvriksh 
and the South Asia Network of Dams, Rivers and People were always present, and there 
were numerous exchanges of information between these two levels. The PMSBV also 
linked up with the International Rivers Network (PMSBV, personal communication, April 
and May 2009). 
On International Rivers Day in March 2005 a mass protest against the Lower Subansiri 
Project was organised by the various local groups on the banks of the River Subansiri, and 
a mass petition was submitted to the Life Insurance Corporation of India, which had 
meanwhile signed a Memorandum of Understanding agreeing to finance the project. In 
October 2005 a mass rally of 5,000 people was held under the PMSBV banner to protest 
against the LSP. Memorandums were sent to the Prime Minister of India, the MoEF, the 
Chief Minister of Assam and the Chief Secretary to the Government of Arunachal 
Pradesh, and it was demanded that the construction of the Lower Subansiri Project (LSP) 
should be suspended until a scientific study report had been published on the possible 
downstream impacts of the project and a public consensus in favour of the project had 
been obtained in the project areas (Chatradhar 2009). This was the first time that it had 
been demanded at local level that a project should be halted until a detailed downstream 
impact study had been conducted. In the following years this issue of a downstream study 
was to shape the movement protesting against the LSP (Chatradhar 2009).  
In late 2006/early 2007, the protest organisation changed its strategy and involved the All 
Assam Student Union (AASU). The AASU is the most powerful student organisation not 
only in Assam but in the entire north-eastern region. As information critical of the LSP 
started flowing from the AASU’s platform, more people suddenly began to take an interest. 
Various government stakeholders and the project developer, perhaps for the first time, 
started to take the views expressed against the project seriously (Partho Das, personal 
communication, 20 April 2009). While the AASU was not willing directly to oppose the 
project, it also did not want to ignore the mass appeal against the project. This resulted in a 
middle course being taken. On 8 December 2006 a tripartite meeting of the government of 
Assam, the project developer and AASU was held. This meeting proved to be a watershed 
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in the events surrounding the Lower Subansiri Project. It was decided that a specialist 
committee, comprising scientists from three prominent research institutions in the area, 
would be set up to study the entire downstream impact of the LSP (AASU 2008, 102–103). 
However, there was a difference of opinion among those attending the meeting over the 
outcome of the study and its bearing on the project decision-making. In its communications 
with various authorities the AASU maintained that it had been decided at the meeting that 
the main work on the dam would not begin until the study was completed and gave the 
project developer a clean sheet (AASU 2008, 102–103). The project developer, on the 
other hand, claimed that no such decision, to stop work on the project work until the impact 
assessment study had been completed, was taken at the meeting (AASU 2008, 108).  
While AASU involvement immediately brought a change in December 2006, things again 
drifted, one and a half years elapsing before the study began. In the meantime the con-
struction of the dam continued. Many of the organisations agitating against the project 
grew increasingly impatient because they could sense a deliberate strategy behind the de-
lay in the study and the continuation of construction until the project reached the point of 
no return and became a fait accompli. Thus pressure was also mounting on the AASU, 
which then wrote letters to the Prime Minister, the Parliamentary Standing Committee and 
the project developer calling for a halt to the work until the study was completed and 
threatening agitation in the alternative (AASU 2008, 102–103). The study finally began in 
mid-2008. Now as the study is being carried out and work on the project continues, the 
protestors are preparing for another showdown when the results are published. 
4.3 The Dibang Multipurpose Project 
The Dibang Multipurpose Project is a 3,000 MW project which includes the construction 
of a concrete gravity dam 288 metres high and a reservoir with an area of 40.09 km2. Once 
completed, the dam will be the highest in India. The project is located in the lower Dibang 
Valley district in Arunachal Pradesh. The submergence area is around 938 hectares, which 
encompass five villages and around 72 households. Some 14 families have been classified 
as partially affected: they will lose about 557 hectares of land (National Productivity 
Council s. a.). 
According to the All Idu Mishmi Student Union (AIMSU), the project developer has been 
engaged in various survey-related activities since 2002. In April 2007 the Arunachal 
Pradesh Pollution Control Board announced in the local newspapers that public hearings 
would be held in Roing and Arzoo. The AIMSU and the Idu Cultural and Literary Society 
(ICLS), two local organisations in the project areas, requested the State Pollution Control 
Board to defer the public hearing dates. The public hearings were then postponed until 
June/July 2007. These two organisations began looking for help outside the state and in 
other areas where people were more aware of dam-related activities and could give these 
organisations some guidance. Subsequently, the AIMSU and ICLS came into contact with 
Kalpvriksh, the Rural Volunteers Centre, Akajan, and the National Forum of Forest Peo-
ple and Forest Workers, New Delhi. These organisations were already active in the North 
East in general and more especially in the Lower Subansiri Project area. Their aim was to 
make people aware of various complexities associated with dam projects. As public 
awareness increased, they informed the Pollution Control Board that more time was 
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needed to study and understand the EIA report. The public hearings were therefore de-
layed until the last week of November 2007. 
In the meantime the AIMSU and ICLS launched a public awareness campaign in collabo-
ration with Kalpvriksh and the Legal Initiative for Forest and Environment, New Delhi. 
By the end of this campaign it was generally held that large dams and large hydro projects 
were not in the interests of the community and their construction would be opposed. How-
ever, the local political leaders in the project area wanted to see the project begun quickly 
and so initiated a countermovement with a view to creating a constituency in favour of the 
dams in the area. This led to the establishment of another institution, the Dibang Basin 
Welfare Committee, which organised public meetings to facilitate the forthcoming public 
hearings, informing the population of the advantages of such mega-projects.  
The AIMSU and its partner organisations opposed the project for a number of reasons. 
First, it was feared that the Idu Mishmi tribe, its members already few in number in the 
country, would be badly affected by the projects. The agitating organisations argued that 
the public interest clause should not override the interests of the local people, the Idu 
Mishmi tribe. The number of people displaced in absolute terms is much smaller than in 
some of the other mega-projects, such as the Tehri Hydro Electricity Project in 
Uttaranchal and the Sardar Sarovar Project in Gujarat. But the Idu Mishmi population is 
already very small, and the project would displace around 8 per cent of the total number of 
Idu Mishmi people. The second argument against the project concerns the territoriality of 
the state’s tribal population. If the displaced Idu Mishmi community was resettled in the 
territory of other tribes, there would be competition for common property resources. This 
would result in intense intertribal conflicts. Third, the AIMSU has also been arguing 
against the popular notion that the Dibang Multipurpose Project will usher in development 
in the hitherto remote and underdeveloped area by providing jobs, awarding contracts and 
increasing business among the local people. According to the AIMSU, only the “creamy 
layer” within the community will be awarded, at best, with some insignificant contracts, 
while the rest of the people will be seen as a source of unskilled labour for the construc-
tion site and of domestic help in the houses of the employees of the project developers 
(AIMSU, personal communication 2009). 
The potential downstream impact attributable to the geological features of the project area 
has also led the movement to assume a spatial pattern in which the AIMSU, which is fo-
cusing more on impacts in the submergence area, has collaborated with downstream 
community-based organisations like Sodiya Mahakuma Suraksha Samiti and Saikhowa 
Suraksha Samiti. Both these organisations are based in the downstream state of Assam and 
concentrate more on the downstream impact. The people of Assam were aware that a 
mega-project was about to be implemented in the Lower Dibang Valley district of Arun-
achal Pradesh, but they did not have any more information. AIMSU started sharing infor-
mation on the project with downstream organisations, and gradually the people of the 
downstream town of Sodiya became aware of the project (Sodiya Mahakuma Suraksha 
Samiti, personal communication 2009). This process was also aided by the PMSBV, 
which was then leading the movement concerned about the downstream impact of the 
Lower Subansiri Project (PMSBV, personal communication 2009). 
To understand the role played by the downstream non-governmental organisations, it will 
be important to consider the broader context of the history of the town of Sodiya. Sodiya 
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was once a prosperous town, but was devastated in 1950 by an earthquake and the ensuing 
floods. The people therefore remember how destructive floods can be. These concerns were 
rekindled in 2004 and 2008 by news from other parts of Assam, where flooding was attrib-
uted to dams upstream in Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. Thus, having accessed concrete 
information from the AIMSU about the proposed Dibang Multipurpose Project, the down-
stream organisations initiated active opposition to the project. In this way the Dibang has 
assumed a unique pattern, with civil society organisations in the upstream state of Arun-
achal Pradesh and the downstream state of Assam jointly engaged in agitation.  
The first public hearing finally took place on 29 January 2008. It continued for 12 hours. 
Afterwards the people were sure that the project would be scrapped, since most of those 
attending the hearing opposed it. The second public hearing was meant to be held on 31 
January 2008. But the people then discovered that the Prime Minister of India was coming 
to Arunachal Pradesh to lay the foundation stone for the project on that very day. This 
attracted considerable criticism from the project area and outside (Veracity, 10 February 
2008, Ghosh 2008) and hardened the position adopted by the agitating organisations. They 
felt that the public hearing had been no more than a procedural requirement, not a genuine 
process of public consultation. It was thus decided that there was no need to hold token 
public hearings, and a second public hearing was opposed. Repeated efforts were subse-
quently made by the state pollution control board and the project developer to hold the 
public hearing, but the agitating organisations, with the support of the local population, 
would not allow it to take place. 
The sustained mass movement of local civil society organisations opposing the project and 
preventing the public hearing from taking place in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam has not 
only delayed the process of environmental clearance, but with time elicited some favour-
able responses from the MoEF’s Expert Appraisal Committee. The Expert Appraisal 
Committee instructed the project authority to reapply for the Terms of Reference of the 
EIA study because the project could not be cleared by 13 September 20089 and also de-
clared that fresh public hearings needed to be held in both the affected districts. The public 
hearing held in Roing in January 2008, which was widely criticised by the agitating civil 
society organisation, became ineffective. Apart from this, the new terms of reference for 
the EIA study issued by the EAC in July 2009 met many of the demands voiced by the 
agitating organisations.  
5 Findings and conclusion 
Decision-making on dams in India involves multiple actors at various stages, each with his 
specific functions and responsibilities. Thus it is more akin to a polycentric decision-
                                                 
9 The Dibang Multipurpose Project had a site clearance based on the EIA Notification 1994. When the 
Government of India produced the 2006 EIA Notification, it set a period of two years (until September 
2008) within which the project would be appraised under the 1994 EIA Notification if submitted to the 
MoEF. As the sustained local community agitation prevented the second obligatory public hearing in the 
Dibang Valley from being held by September 2008, it was decided at the EAC’s 27th meeting in June 
2009 that the Dibang Project would have to reapply for the EIA study under the 2006 EIA Notification 
and also to hold fresh public hearings in the two districts. Thus the public hearing in the Lower Dibang 
Valley district was considered null and void under the new directions. 
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making setting where the authorities at the respective levels are endowed with certain 
powers. The role of public participation is formally limited in the overall decision-making 
but, because the process is long and involves many actors at various levels, the general 
public and civil society organisations are allowed to approach and try to influence them. In 
recent years civil society organisations have influenced decision-making by directly ac-
cessing the governmental or government-empowered committees. If violations or com-
plaints are not noted and addressed by the administrative or regulatory system, the people 
have approached the judiciary and filed lawsuits.  
Historically, the role of public participation in the decision-making process has been lim-
ited, that process consisting solely of interaction between government departments. This 
has changed little over the years. What change there has been has occurred in the envi-
ronmental sphere, where the only organised form of public participation, the public hear-
ing, is to be found. This paper has shown that the public hearing is the only sounding 
board for public opinion on dam projects. It thus becomes one of the most contested and 
controversial arenas. As has been evident over the years from the EIA notifications, the 
public hearing has been one of the more important areas for reforms.  
To perform as a scientific tool which correctly anticipates future environmental impacts 
and suggests mitigation measures, EIA is based on a number of assumptions. The first is 
that EIA accurately defines a socio-environmental baseline situation, the second that it 
correctly identifies impacts and does not underestimate them, the third that it suggests 
suitable mitigation measures and the last that the mitigation measures are fully imple-
mented. If all these assumptions are to be fulfilled, those involved in the EIA process must 
focus on nut-and-bolt issues. Analysis of the EIA Notification and the point of contention 
in the various cases studied show that there are structural constraints both in the notifica-
tion and in its actual implementation.  
Inadequate baseline information and associated impacts at one level has been the main 
point of contention in the various projects. There have also been persistent allegations of 
failure to comply with the environmental management plans. In the notification the moni-
toring of compliance and the sanctioning of violations are the most weakly addressed. 
While the 1994 EIA Notification was strong in its insistence on sanctions, there were per-
sistent allegations that the quality of environmental reports was poor (Menon / Kohli 
2009). This showed that a strongly worded text is not necessarily translated into practical 
results. Instead of addressing this issue, the 2006 EIA Notification relaxed the sanctions. 
Most of the structural constraints in the EIA Notification are not addressed because EIA is 
often perceived as an administrative hurdle rather than a scientific tool.  
The lacunas in the environmental clearance process have often triggered controversies and 
arguments against dam projects in recent years. The vehement opposition to the projects in 
the form of criticism of the EIA reports or the EIA process frequently results in ad hoc 
decision-making at project level. This may strengthen the environmental standards that are 
then followed in the project concerned, but the structural constraints to proper identifica-
tion of impacts, mitigation and proper monitoring of the mitigation remain unresolved.  
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World Commission on Dams and local norms 
This study also argues that, rather than the WCD norms being gradually diffused in do-
mestic civil society, it was the norms that were circulating in the domestic policy domain 
which became an international anchor when the World Commission on Dams was estab-
lished.  
As early as 1989 the National Working Group based its argument for developing a reset-
tlement policy to the benefit of displaced people on the principles of equity, participation 
and sustainability. More than a decade later, in 2000, the WCD recommendations defined 
equity, sustainability and participation as the values which would “run through the entire 
report” (WCD 2000, 199). The National Working Group’s 1989 draft makes a strong case 
for comprehensive option assessment. It argues that, as projects form part of a realm of 
“socioeconomic realities” and are “neither formulated nor executed in a social and politi-
cal vacuum”, so “choices should be made from among various alternatives” and decisions 
on a project should not be a fait accompli. The option assessment argument, as opposed to 
a fait accompli, has again been placed within a strong framework capable of sustaining 
human rights. The National Working Group’s draft also argued that participation should 
not depend on the project developer. Rather, it should be the right of the affected popula-
tion to take part in the decision-making on such projects from “inception to completion, 
and even thereafter.” The draft thus recommended something similar to “gaining public 
acceptance,” as the WCD report was to do later. To make the participation process really 
effective rather than symbolic, the National Working Group also called for a right of ac-
cess to information. In the line it follows, in the principles it formulates and in the ap-
proach it adopts to human and constitutional rights, the National Working Group’s 1989 
draft policy is thus similar to the report published by the WCD in 2000. Subsequently, in 
1994 and 1998, similar arguments were advanced as an alternative to the drafts proposed 
by the Government of India.  
In these circumstances it is not therefore surprising that, although the Government of India 
and the Ministry of Water Resources rejected the report outright; sections of civil society 
would continue and still continue to espouse it. Indian civil society was also proactive in 
standing by its views throughout the WCD process, while the government’s attitude was 
not enthusiastic (Iyer 2003). The process of discursive dominance by the Indian civil soci-
ety was also accelerated by the presence of India’s civil society leaders as a WCD Com-
missioner and the fact that she was one of the important people in the old civil society 
movement. 
The era of dam construction until the early 1980s can be described as a period of innocent 
ignorance10 and the time when social and environmental movements and civil-society-
driven consciousness-building began to emerge. These developments have been attributed 
to transnational norm diffusion and transnational collective action by civil society (Kha-
gram 2004), as the great controversy over the Narmada Sardar Sarovar Project has demon-
strated. On the basis of cross-sectional and cross-temporal studies it is argued here that 
change in India cannot entirely be attributed to transnational collective action and transna-
tional norm diffusion. Rather, it is argued that the incorporation of superior standards in 
                                                 
10 This term was coined by R. Ramaswamy Iyer during the Sixth Dialogue on Water held in Bonn in  
September 2009. 
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national policy documents and steps to ensure that superior practices are followed at project 
level are outcomes of a long process of negotiation between state actors and such domestic 
non-state actors as academics, social activists and NGOs. At the same time the multilateral 
and bilateral development agencies and financial institutions have had a strong adaptive 
influence on the government. Most of the draft resettlement policies prepared in the 1990s 
referred explicitly to requirements requested by multilateral financial institutions as one of 
the factors underlying the drafting of a rehabilitation and resettlement policy. 
Analysis of the content of the government policies drafted by various ministries and gov-
ernment agencies over the years reveals a gradual progression in that the resettlement 
package or resettlement planning per se becomes more inclusive, whereas attitudes remain 
highly exclusive when it comes to discussing a strategic issue, such as gaining public ac-
ceptance or comprehensive option assessment, relating to the selection of a dam from 
among various options. 
International actors as norm carriers 
The presence of the International Finance Corporation promoted improved standards in 
the Allain Duhangan Hydropower Project during the clearance process. Public participa-
tion in this project prior to investment clearance was better informed than in other, domes-
tically funded projects. It should be realised that, when this project was submitted to the 
IFC, it had already received all the clearances required by the Government of India. It was 
only because the IFC became involved and had its own information disclosure system that 
a great deal of information was put in the public domain. This then formed the basis for 
the lobbying by civil society organisations, which resulted in the appointment of inde-
pendent regulators for public hearings and of independent organisations to demystify the 
EIA reports for villagers before public hearings. These procedures are not common in In-
dia and can be attributed to the IFC’s presence. The reforms, along with a series of nego-
tiations between families affected by the project and the project developer on cash com-
pensation, were driven by NGOs and local level community mobilisation. But it would not 
have been possible, or would have been many times more difficult, if the IFC had not been 
mandated to upgrade standards which were found to be lacking at project level by the 
NGOs. In this regard a comparison can be made with the Lower Subansiri Project, where 
there were no such international actors. As this was one of the first large dam projects in 
the region, general awareness was initially low in the community and local civil society 
organisations. It has always been alleged that the people were not adequately informed 
about the Lower Subansiri Project or about their role, rights and responsibilities during 
and before the public hearing. It was alleged by the civil society organisations represented 
at the Lower Subansiri public hearing that, when one of the regulators present raised some 
points in opposition to the project, he was told that, as a regulator, he was required to sup-
port it.  
In terms of the processes leading to the clearance, the IFC’s presence ensured that Allain 
Duhangan fared much better than Lower Subansiri. But with regard to such isssues as 
whether the local populace had a voice in the project decision-making, whether attempts 
were made to gain public acceptance and whether the adoption of socially and environ-
mentally sustainable norms was a precondition for project approval, the two projects were 
similar. While fewer people may have been dissatisfied with Allain Duhangan than with 
Lower Subansiri, both projects went ahead against a background in which a majority of 
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the people were dissatisfied with the ongoing clearance process and wanted it to be halted, 
postponed or rejected. The IFC’s presence ensured that there was a strong environmental 
management plan, which the project developer was meant to follow. But in the post-
clearance phase the project developer was often pulled up by the state government and 
fined for contravening the clearance. Thus it was also found that the approved environ-
mental management plan was not strictly monitored even where the IFC was present. In 
the case of Allain Duhangan many of the reforms following the IFC’s clearance of the 
project were undertaken as a result of lawsuits. Here again, it resembled other projects 
where the judiciary had been one of the agents in the introduction of progressive reforms. 
Evidence from Allain Duhangan indicates that, although the presence of international ac-
tors may be a necessary condition for the application of superior standards, it is not suffi-
cient to ensure compliance with them.  
Social mobilisation as an agent of norm diffusion 
Social mobilisation by civil society organisations has been the main catalytic agent in 
bringing changes to project decision-making. The pattern of civil society action is quite 
different in the three projects. If social mobilisation and civil society action are unpacked, 
it is found that, while NGOs at national and regional level spearhead the mobilisation of 
civil society, there are also local non-governmental, mass-based and political organisations 
at project level acting as pressure groups. Some or all of these actors may try to form a 
coalition to coordinate their activities and so become a pressure group in opposition to the 
project developer. In the process they will try to influence project decision-making and 
bring about incremental changes and reforms in the projects.  
Until the Allain Duhangan Project obtained clearance, the movement was led largely by 
regional and national organisations supporting the villagers. But at the post-clearance 
stage the movement was spearheaded solely by the village-based organisation. At that 
stage the local organisation perhaps continued to maintain some loose coalition with the 
national-level organisation through exchanges of information, but there was no coalition in 
the area of strategic decision-making or action. In the case of the Lower Subansiri Project, 
on the other hand, the movement was largely led by national and regional NGOs until the 
end of 2004. The local-level mobilisation was still diffuse. At this stage it was the national 
or regional NGOs which tried to affect decision-making by engaging directly with the 
regulatory authorities or by filing lawsuits in the Supreme Court. One of the objectives 
was obviously to stall or at least modify the project, but a by-product of this was that deci-
sion-making at regulatory level was far more informed and the clearances issued were 
subject to strict environmental conservation conditions. The Lower Subansiri Project dif-
fered from the Allain Duhangan Project, however, in that the coalition between local 
NGOs and national or regional NGOs continued in the post-clearance stage and grew in 
strength. And as social mobilisation at local level became stronger, it was able to attract 
sufficient attention from various powerful local actors, such as the politicians in the state 
and mass-based organisations. When all these actors eventually formed a coalition, they 
were able to pressure the project developer into rethinking its strategy. This manifested 
itself in the project developer’s commissioning of a comprehensive downstream impact 
study of the Lower Subansiri Project. 
In the case of the Dibang Multipurpose Project two things happened simultaneously. First, 
by the time this project had become contentious, the people were fairly well aware of the 
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consequences of dam-building. The community in the project area is compact, and the 
movement was led by strong local organisations from the outset. Thus while Allain Du-
hangan, seen in hindsight, was unable to prompt a strong mass movement in its area, 
Lower Subansiri generated strong social mobilisation at local level, but rather late, when 
the project was already at an advanced stage of construction. In contrast to the other two, 
the Dibang Multipurpose Project was confronted from a very early stage with a strong 
mass movement at local level, which was able to spread from that level into the areas 
downstream from the project and generate a unique form of upstream-downstream inter-
state social mobilisation. At the same time, the various movements were able to forge suc-
cessful coalitions with NGOs outside the region, including some mass organisations al-
ready taking action in the adjoining Lower Subansiri area. Some of what the civil society 
organisation had learnt from Subansiri was thus transferred to the civil society organisa-
tions in the Dibang valley.  
What proved to be the most effective strategy pursued in the case of the Dibang Multipur-
pose Project by the local NGOs was to stall the public hearing process. At the same time, 
the success of this strategy also reveals the weaknesses that exist in the environmental 
clearance process. There is no doubt that India, under a very active Environment Minister, 
is currently planning a complete overhaul of the environmental clearance system. 
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